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This study explores the existence of a wage curve for Spain. To 
quantify this relationship for the Spanish economy, we used individual data 
from the EPF 1990-1991. The results show the presence of a wage curve with 
an elasticity of –0.13. The availability of very detailed information on wages 
and unemployment has also shown that less protected labour market groups –
young workers, manual workers and building sector workers- have a higher 
elasticity of wages to local unemployment. These results could be interpreted 
as a greater facility of firms in these segments to settle wages as a function of 
the unemployment rate. 
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Este trabajo investiga la existencia o no de una curva de salarios en 
España. Para cuantificar esta relación para la economía española, se han 
utilizado datos de la EPF 1990-1991. Los resultados obtenidos permiten 
concluir la existencia de una curva de salarios con una elasticidad de –0.13. 
La disponibilidad de un elevado nivel de desagregación en la información 
estadística sobre salarios individuales y desempleo provincial también ha 
permitido concluir que los colectivos menos protegidos del mercado de 
trabajo – jóvenes, trabajadores manuales y trabajadores del sector de la 
construcción – presentan una menor elasticidad de los salarios al desempleo 
local. Estos resultados pueden interpretarse como evidencia de que en estos 
segmentos las empresas tienen una mayor facilidad para fijar los salarios en 
función de la tasa de paro. 
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regionales 
 





WAGE CURVES FOR SPAIN  




The relationship between unemployment and wages, which has been 
dominated by the Phillips curve literature for a long time, is being revised from 
a new frame that takes the work of Blanchflower and Oswald as a starting point, 
especially their book The Wage Curve (1994). These authors concluded that 
there was a negative relationship between the level of individual wages in a 
territory and its unemployment rate. The graph of this relationship is a wage 
curve with a negative slope and an elasticity of –0.10. 
The curve is estimated as a Mincer equation where individual wages are a 
function of the individual human capital (schooling and experience), other 
individual characteristics and the kind of job, but augmented with the 
                                                          
1 Previous versions of this paper were presented in the 40 Congress of the European Regional 
Science Association and in the IV Encuentro de Economía Aplicada. Comments by 
participants in both congresses have been very helpful to improve the paper, specially those 
by J. M. Labeaga and J. L. Roig. Authors wish to thank the National Program of Social and 
Economic Studies of the CICYT (Project SEC 1999-0432) and the Generalitat de Catalunya 
(Project 1999SGR00017) for the support received. We would also like to thank the research 
assistance of Montserrat Álvarez, Juan Carlos Duque and Juan Luis Ollero in compilating the 
unemployment database. Of course, all remaining errors are own. 
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consideration of the unemployment rate of the region in which the person is 
employed. The estimation of this equation with individual data allows a measure 
of the elasticity of wages to local unemployment. Several authors have carried 
out this kind of empirical exercise for many countries and most show wage 
curves with a negative slope and elasticities close to –0.10.  
In comparison to the progress of empirical knowledge on the topic, the 
theoretical explanations of this relationship have not advanced as quickly. The 
wage curve has been explained in the frame of the theories on wage rigidity, 
bargaining models and efficiency wages. The latter best explains the empirical 
evidence, as its predictions are confirmed by econometric studies. However, 
there are some results that are incompatible with these explanations, therefore 
further advances in the theoretical approach are required. 
This paper tests whether a wage curve is present in the Spanish economy. 
The analysis of the wage-local unemployment relationship for Spain is 
especially relevant because of the institutional characteristics of its labour 
market. In the year of reference of the data (1990), the Spanish labour market 
was characterised by an intermediate collective bargaining system with high 
coverage, high firing costs, a quite generous benefit system, and very high rates 
of unemployment and long-term unemployment. Consequently, a low elasticity 
of wages to unemployment or even the absence of a wage curve is expected. 
However, fixed-term contracts represented 35.1% of the total private sector 
employees, implying a high turnover, and a certain monopsonistic power of 
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firms to settle wages according to the evolution of the unemployment rate. An 
additional reason to analyse the relationship between wages and local 
unemployment for Spain is the limitations of previous studies on this topic. 
Finally, an analysis of the Spanish labour market from this perspective is 
facilitated by the availability of a detailed database: the Encuesta de 
Presupuestos Familiares (Family Budget Survey) for 1990/91. This survey 
includes information at a provincial level (NUTS III), thereby allowing the 
division of the Spanish territory into 50 local labour markets. This dataset also 
allows an estimation of disaggregated wage curves for diverse groups taking 
into account their gender, age, schooling level or the activity sector in which 
they are employed2. 
In this paper we present an estimate for a wage curve for the whole 
Spanish economy and other estimates for the diverse activity sectors, genders, 
age groups, levels of schooling and kind of occupations. Our results show a 
wage curve with an elasticity of –0.13. There is also evidence that supports a 
negative relationship between wages and unemployment for the building and 
services sectors, for men, for young workers (from 20 to 29 years old), for 
workers with medium education, and for occupations with low and medium 
qualification requirements. These results are in accordance with most studies 
                                                          
2 The level of detail of the disaggregated wage curves presented here for the Spanish economy 
is only available for the United States (Turunen, 1998); Germany (Baltagi and Blien, 1998) 
and Australia (Kennedy and Borland 2000). 
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that have addressed the topic, except for the elasticities for the distinct schooling 
levels, which, in other countries, are higher for workers with fewer schooling 
years. 
In the next section, several theoretical explanations of the wage curve 
(bargaining models and efficiency wages) are briefly summarised; in the third 
section, the methodology and the database are described and the empirical 
results obtained are shown. The paper ends summarising the main conclusions. 
 
2. The wage curve 
 
During the first half of the nineties, Blanchflower and Oswald developed 
an ambitious research program on the relationship between individual wages and 
local unemployment rates using several databases for a wide set of countries at 
the individual level (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, 1994a, 1994b, 1995b). 
The main result of these studies was the finding of an empirical regularity, 
which was called “the wage curve”. This curve establishes an inverse 
relationship between individual wages and the local unemployment rate. More 
precisely, a worker living in an area of high unemployment earns a lower wage 
than those with identical characteristics living in an area with less 
unemployment. A more surprising result is that the elasticity of wages to 
unemployment is very close to –0.10, a value that is quite stable among 
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countries –with diverse institutional frameworks-, among a range of time 
periods and for distinct samples or databases. 
 
2.1. Theoretical explanations 
 
A negative relationship between wages and regional unemployment is 
contradictory –at least, at first sight- with the theory of compensatory wage 
differences as given initially by Adam Smith and more formally expressed at the 
territory level by Harris and Todaro (1970) and by Hall (1972). According to the 
latter, there is a positive relationship between the two variables: the wage rate is 
higher in the areas of high unemployment to equalize annual earnings or wages 
plus unemployment insurance, in the different regions. However, both 
theoretical approaches are compatible as shown below.  
Taking into account that the compensatory differences theory postulates a 
positive relationship between wages and unemployment, it is necessary to give a 
theoretical explanation of the empirical negative relationship found in the 
empirical literature by other authors. The explanation must rely on non-
competitive labour market models as the competitive theory will not fit this 
result. In effect, if the labour markets are competitive, there is unemployment 
only while the wage level adjusts to the new market conditions and, therefore, 
ceteris paribus the higher the wage, the higher the unemployment. The 
relationship between the two variables is positive. 
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The most relevant theoretical explanations for the wage curve are twofold: 
the bargaining model and efficiency wages.  
In the bargaining model, wages are the results of a bargaining process 
between firms and unions. In the model proposed by De Menil (1971) and used 
by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b), a wage equation is obtained following 
this expression: w=a+s(p/n), where a is the wage that a worker losing his/her job 
can obtain in the labour market, s is the bargaining power of the union and p/n 
are the profits by worker. The idea is that the higher the unemployment, the 
longer it will take a fired worker to find a new job and, consequently, his/her 
income after being fired (a) will be lower. This decrease in a reduces w and 
generates an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage 
w. A complementary possibility is that if unemployment is linked to lower 
economic activity (at least in the short term) and to lower profits by worker 
(p/n), then, ceteris paribus, wages will be lower. An alternative version of the 
bargaining model is that in which unions try to maximise the incomes of all 
workers and not only those employed. In this case, a high level of 
unemployment implies a change in the preferences of unions towards a higher 
level of employment, although wages will be lower for workers employed. In 
this context, wages will be lower when unemployment is higher (Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1995a). 
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This kind of theoretical explanation for the wage curve has, however, 
some limitations that have been highlighted mainly by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1995a) and Card (1995). First, in spite of very similar wage curves 
between countries, the density and role of unions differ. Second, empirical 
results are consistent with the finding of high elasticity values of wages to 
unemployment for unaffiliated workers while for those affiliated to unions very 
low values or even no wage curve are usually found (Turunen, 1998). 
The second explanation of the wage curve is based on the efficiency 
wages models. Of the versions of efficiency wages3, two are usually considered 
in the literature. The first is based on the idea of shirking (Weiss, 1980; Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984). Workers have a utility function that depends on their wage 
and on the possibility of eluding their labour responsibility, as the effort derived 
from work reduces his/her utility. Therefore, the worker will try to shirk the 
maximum time without losing his/her job. In conditions of low unemployment, 
the effort will be lower because if discovered and fired he/she will soon find 
another job. As the monitoring of workers entails costs, an efficient solution is 
to pay high wages, thereby increasing the cost of shirking. Consequently, a 
situation of low unemployment and high wages is compatible. In the presence of 
high unemployment, the opposite happens: finding a new job is difficult, 
                                                          
3 See Stiglitz (1986) for a review of modern theories of wage setting, and more particularly, 
about alternative explanations of efficiency wages. 
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workers increase their efforts receiving low wages, and, as a result, high 
unemployment and low wages are observed.  
The second version used to explain the wage curve is based on the idea of 
labour turnover caused by quits (Phelps, 1970; Stiglitz, 1982). In this model, 
workers obtain utility from their wage and from the positive characteristics of 
the job. Therefore, they try to find jobs with favourable combinations of wages 
and desired characteristics (or labour conditions). Leaving the job voluntarily is 
a way to allot resources (time) to the search for a better job. These entail costs 
for firms because of undesired turnover. Firms try to minimise turnover by 
paying higher wages to retain workers. Ceteris paribus, these wages will be 
higher when the unemployment rate is low because the search time for a new job 
will be lower and the probability of finding one will be greater (and the quits 
rate also higher). In this context, the negative relationship between wages and 
unemployment reappears4. 
The distinct levels of unemployment in regions allow us to observe the 
negative relationship at a territorial level between individual wages and local 
unemployment, as in areas with low unemployment, wages will be higher to 
                                                          
4 Campbell and Orszag (1998) develop a model of the wage curve based in this explanation of 
quits and they find an interesting result: the elasticity of wages to unemployment does not 
depend on institutional characteristics or on the employment policy of the considered country 
but on the elasticity of quits to the unemployment rate. According to these authors, this fact 
could explain that different studies have found an elasticity to wages to unemployment close 
to –0.10 in countries with different labour market institutions. 
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discourage people from leaving jobs voluntarily and from shirking, while in 
areas with high unemployment firms assure the same result even if they pay less. 
Theoretical explanations should also take into account the possibility of 
migration, as workers in areas of high unemployment and low wages move to 
regions with improved conditions. In equilibrium, in the long term regions 
should offer the same utility, which is derived from the combination of wages 
and unemployment. Given that migration entails costs, workers do not move in 
response to changes in contemporaneous unemployment rates, but only when 
permanent differences are observed. In the long term, firms in regions with high 
permanent unemployment should compensate this disadvantage by paying 
higher wages. Blanchflower and Oswald (1995b) admit that there may be a 
positive long-term association between the expected wage and the average 
unemployment rate. However, in the short term, while migratory flows do not 
compensate the net advantage of the different regions, the relationship observed 
between wages and contemporary unemployment is negative. 
In addition, efficiency wage models not only explain the negative slope of 
the wage-unemployment curve but also generate forecasts that are compatible 
with empirical evidence. According to this approach, the effort of a group of 
workers –young workers, for example- depends on the cost for them to find a 
new job after being fired for shirking. This cost depends on the situation and 
characteristics of the labour market for this group rather than the evolution of 
the aggregate labour market. In this regard, if the labour segment for young 
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workers is characterised by higher unemployment and high turnover, the 
prediction will be that firms assure the maximum effort of this group without 
having to pay high wages. In other words, firms can exert their monopsonistic 
power with this segment, which implies a wage curve with a higher slope. The 
same happens with other groups: manual workers, non-affiliated earners, 
workers in certain activity sectors and ethnic minorities. And this is simply the 
result obtained unanimously by the empirical literature on the wage curve. 
Therefore, we can conclude that this efficiency wage models best explain the 
empirical regularity found by Blanchflower and Oswald. 
More recently, Sato (2000) proposed an explanation of the wage curve on 
the basis of search models. In the absence of migration, a search model 
combined with regional variations in productivity generates a negative 
relationship between wages and unemployment. In regions with high 
productivity, wages and vacancy supply will be higher, thereby generating a 
lower unemployment level. Nevertheless, the possibility of migrating produces a 
massive movement of labour to areas of higher productivity (higher wage and 
low unemployment). In Sato’s model (2000), this migratory flow decreases as a 
result of incorporating congestion costs derived from the hypothesis of a 
monocentric structure. These are commuting costs and housing costs, which 
increase when the population grows. In equilibrium, there is no migration 
because congestion costs compensate the differences in productivity (of wages 
and unemployment). 
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In spite of these theoretical explanations, and the good predictions of 
efficiency wage models, it is necessary to make further progress in this field, as 
some empirical results are not compatible with any of these explanations. For 
example, the high elasticity of wages to unemployment rates of self-employed 
workers detected by Turunen (1998). 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
 
The empirical literature on the wage curve includes evidence from many 
countries (Table 1) for which a wage curve has been found5. 
There is also extensive empirical evidence on the disaggregation of the 
curve for distinct groups of workers that shows that these elasticities (the slopes 
of the curve) differ for each group. 
This evidence can be explained by the fact that the reactions of diverse 
groups of workers to the conditions of the local labour market differ (Card, 
1995; Turunen, 1998). In this context, wages of the internal labour market –with 
higher tenure in the firm- will be less sensitive to the economic cycle. The same 
is expected for workers with higher levels of specific human capital –because of 
tenure or qualification-, for workers protected by a strong union or by higher 
firing costs, and for public sector workers. 
                                                          
5 Blanchflower (2001) also analyses Slovenia and Kyrgyzstan but no wage curve is found for 
them. 
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A complementary explanation could be derived by considering the ways 
in which wages are measured (Card, 1995). The best way of estimating the wage 
curve is using data on hourly wages, although generally there is none available 
for this variable. For this reason, annual wages are usually used. However, 
annual wages are the result of the product of the hourly wage by the annual 
number of hours worked. In empirical studies, the elasticity of wages to 
unemployment obtained could be overestimated, as it is the sum of the elasticity 
to unemployment and of the elasticity to hours worked. When considering the 
specific curves for groups of workers the incidence of this phenomenon could be 
relevant and could help to explain the differences in the values of the elasticities 
estimated. For example, if the number of hours worked by unskilled employees 
decreases more rapidly than the number of hours worked by skilled employees, 
the annual wages of the former will decrease faster than the latter. In this 
context, and even if the hourly wage is constant, the elasticity of wages to 
unemployment for the unskilled segment will be higher. 
 
3. Features of the Spanish labour market, methodology and results 
 
The analysis of the wage-local unemployment relationship for Spain is 
especially relevant because of the institutional characteristics of its labour 
market. In 1990, year of reference of the data base considered, the Spanish 
labour market was characterised by an intermediate collective bargaining system 
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–like most continental European countries- with a reduced union density (13%), 
but with a high coverage (76%) (OECD, 1997). Moreover, firing costs were 
high (OECD, 1994, chapter 6). These features indicate a high bargaining 
strength of insiders. Moreover, the benefit system was quite generous until 1992, 
especially in terms of the replacement ratio but also in terms of duration (OECD, 
1988). Long-term unemployment accounted for about 53% of total 
unemployment and the underground economy was considerable. These data 
allow us to conclude that there was low search intensity and a low eligibility of 
unemployed and, consequently, a reduced pressure on wages to decrease. 
Because of these characteristics, a low elasticity of wages to unemployment or 
even no wage curve is plausible. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate in 1990 was 16.3%, nearly double the 
unemployment rate in the member states of the European Union. This data also 
suggests low elasticity as international evidence show that the curve is flatter 
when the unemployment rate is higher.  
However, other institutional characteristics suggest the contrary: a higher 
elasticity of wages to unemployment. From 1984, fixed-term contracts were 
introduced into the Spanish labour market. In 1990, this kind of contract 
accounted for 30.4% of total employees and 35.1% of the private sector total 
wage earners. This situation implied higher turnover and a higher exposure of 
workers –and their wages- to labour market conditions. It is interesting, then, to 
test the dominant effect -institutional rigidities versus contractual flexibility- and 
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to analyse whether there was a dual labour market between these two 
collectives: those with fixed-term contracts and those with permanent contracts. 
An additional reason to analyse the relationship between wages and 
unemployment for the Spanish economy is the limitations of previous studies on 
this topic. Canziani (1997) worked with Spanish data from the Encuesta de 
Estructura, Conciencia y Biografía de Clase of 1991 where the unemployment 
rate is not disaggregated at territorial level. This author considers labour markets 
by gender and age (eight labour markets: gender by four age groups) and 
obtained an elasticity of wages to unemployment of –0.13. However, the values 
in that study cannot be accepted as estimates of a “Blanchflower and Oswald 
wage curve”, as the elasticity was not related with territory. Montuenga (2000) 
used the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 1995 to estimate a 
wage curve for Spain. However, the limited territorial detail of the data, which 
only allowed the study of seven large regions (NUTS I), makes it impossible to 
apply proper econometric methods. Consequently, the reliability of those results 
is limited. In a more recent study, Montuenga et al. (2003) tried to overcome 
this econometric limitation using unemployment data not only by regions but 
also by age and gender. In this regard, the analysis in that study cannot be 
strictly considered a wage curve analysis à la “Blanchflower and Oswald” as it 
contrasted the presence of the curve using a definition of unemployment that 
involved variables other than territory. Therefore, there are no wage curve 
estimates for Spain using micro data with high enough territorial detail to use 
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local labour market unemployment rates. Consequently, disaggregated wage 




Here we applied a methodological approach that is usual in the literature. 
In particular, the logarithm of annual wages was regressed on a number of 
control variables related to personal and job characteristics and the local 
unemployment rate. In particular, a semi logarithmic function, which, according 
to Mincer (1974), is the most appropriate functional form, was estimated, where 
the logarithm of annual wages depends on a vector of individual and job 
characteristics, and the local unemployment rate. 
The initial model proposed is the following: 
 
 ijjijij euzfw += ),(  (1) 
 
                                                          
6 From a different perspective, Bentolila and Dolado (1991) estimate regional wage equations 
using macro data for the 17 Spanish Autonomous Communities (NUTS II). Their results show 
that the growth rate of average regional wages do not react quickly to regional unemployment 
rate above the national one. Villaverde (1999) using also regional data for the period 1980-
1995, confirms that the growth rate of regional wages is not influenced by the evolution of 
regional unemployment. However, in both works the methodology consists in estimating 
Phillips-curve type relationships using time series models. 
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where wij is the natural logarithm of the annual wage of the individual i that lives 
in the province j, zij is a set of individual factors that can affect wages of the 
individual, such as the level of schooling, his/her experience or other 
characteristics such as gender or the kind of occupation, uj is the unemployment 
rate in territory j and, finally, eij is a random error term which follows a normal 
distribution with zero average and constant variance. 
The data used in this study are from the Encuesta de Presupuestos 
Familiares (Family Budget Survey) carried out by the INE (the Spanish Institute 
of Statistics) for the second quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991. The 
main aim of this survey was the study of expenditure on goods and services by 
families in Spain. Nevertheless, the survey collected information of diverse 
types about families. In this additional information we found data on personal 
and job characteristics and wages, among others. The availability of this broad 
individualised information, and the fact that it is available at the provincial level 
(NUTS III) made it ideal for our purposes, as it was then possible to analyse 50 
territorial labour markets7. 
The earnings variable from this data is the annual income from paid 
employment. To avoid the inclusion of inaccurate data, we used only 
information about the 12,494 individuals who worked in private non-agricultural 
                                                          
7 As Card (1995) highlights, in the estimates of the wage curve the number of degrees of 
freedom are determined by the different number of considered labour markets and not by the 
number of individual observations. This fact is even clearer when the model is estimated 
using the cell-means procedure. 
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industries and for who all the additional information was available (Table 7). 
Therefore, the sample analysed did not include information about employees in 
the public or agricultural sectors.  
Public sector workers were excluded because their wages respond in a 
different way to changes in the unemployment rates than those of other sectors 
(Turunen, 1998). The wages of public sector workers are fixed in a centralised 
way and usually there is no bargaining process. For this reason, wages are highly 
insensitive to the local labour market conditions. 
However, the reason to exclude agricultural workers is related to the 
definition of the endogenous variable from the statistical information provided 
by the EPF. In particular, the information on individual wages provided was the 
annual nominal wage. In this regard, because of the seasonality of agricultural 
work and, as a result, its temporality annual wages are clearly influenced by the 
number of hours worked. Therefore, this could affect the results and we chose to 
omit this group of workers from the analysis. 
This problem not only affects agricultural workers but the whole sample. 
However, the effect of the number of hours worked on the wages can be 
considered less relevant in other labour sectors. Card (1995) and Blanchard and 
Katz (1997), among others, state that it is inappropriate to use annual wages as 
the endogenous variable of a wage curve analysis. According to these authors, 
this kind of analysis requires information on the hourly wage. However, the 
results found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) and Kennedy and Borland 
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(2000) show that the estimated coefficient and the statistical significance of the 
regional unemployment rate is robust to the diverse definitions of wages8. 
Moreover, for the Spanish economy, it is not possible to use information on the 
hourly wage in this kind of analysis and keep a high level of territorial detail. 
Regarding the Zij included in equation (1), the information from the EPF 
about individuals allows the control of the following characteristics: gender, 
main income provider, potential experience and its square, part-time job, level of 
schooling (4 categories), occupation (2 categories) and activity sector (3 
categories)9. 
Unemployment data by provinces (the higher territorial detail provided by 
the EPF) for non-agricultural sectors were obtained from the Encuesta de 
Población Activa (EPA) (Labour Force Survey). In particular, the average 
unemployment rate of the three last quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 
was used, as this is the time when the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares was 
conducted. Data for provincial unemployment rates by gender and by activity 
sectors were obtained from the same source using the same procedure. 
However, because the EPA does not provide this information with the 
required level of detail, provincial unemployment rates by age and levels of 
                                                          
8 Collier (2000) found the same results working with wage per hour and with the monthly 
wage. 
9 Although the available information in the EPF will permit to use a higher number of 
categories for some variables, we reduced its number due to econometric reasons that will be 
further explained. 
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schooling were obtained from the Censo de Población (Population Census) for 
1991. In this regard, it is important to highlight that this source provides data on 
the situation of individuals at March 1st 1991. 
The unemployment rate was included in the specification in logarithms, as 
this is the specification used by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) and the one 
generally used in the literature. Moreover, given that individual wages are also 
expressed in logarithms, this specification allows a direct interpretation of the 
coefficient value as the elasticity of wages to unemployment. 
Having specified the model and defined the endogenous and explanatory 
variables, the next step consists of estimating equation (1). However, a difficulty 
arises because this equation includes an explanatory variable of interest (the 
unemployment rate of the territory j), which is defined at a higher level of 
aggregation (province) than the dependent variable (individual). As Moulton 
(1986) shows, the estimation by ordinary least squares of this kind of equation 
will biase upward the values of the test of individual significance for this 
variable. In other words, the significance of the unemployment rate, and the 
presence of a wage curve could be accepted as a consequence of the estimation 
procedure applied. As Kennedy and Borland (2000) demonstrated, in the case of 
the wage curve, this could happen when the wages of workers of each region 
have a common component that cannot be fully explained by their individual 
characteristics or by the unemployment rate and, then, the error term would be 
correlated for wages of the same region. 
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To overcome this problem, we estimated equation (1) by grouping the 
data of the dependent variable and for each explanatory variable by calculating 
the average for individual groups (for the individuals in every territory j). This 
procedure is known as “cell-means” estimation. Therefore, the equation to 
estimate is as follows: 
 
 jjjj euzfw += ),(  (2) 
 
where the notation of the variables is similar to that used in equation (1) and the 
subindex j is related to all the territories considered. 
However, when working with grouped data the OLS estimator is unbiased 
but inefficient (Greene, 1998, pp. 374-376). For this reason, it is better to 
estimate the model using weighted least squares using jn , as weights where nj 
is the number of individuals in each group considered10. 
An undesired consequence of this estimation procedure is that it reduces 
considerably the number of observations and the number of degrees of freedom.  
Because of this and although the EPF 1990/91 offers detailed information on 
                                                          
10 An alternative solution to the problem of the inefficiency of the OLS estimator consists in 
applying generalized least squares or maximum likelihood. In practice, the three methods 
offer similar results (although with different computational costs) if there is no 
heteroscedasticity in the regression with grouped data (see Dickens, 1990). For this reason, in 
every model shown we tested the presence of heteroscedasticity using White’s test. In any 
case, the null hypothesis could be rejected. 
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individual characteristics, it was necessary to define wider categories for control 
variables because the number of observations available once the averages by 
group were calculated were clearly lower than the number of explanatory 
variables. In this regard, the empirical evidence by Kennedy and Borland (2000) 
shows that a reduction in the number of explanatory variables does not greatly 
affect the empirical results for the value or the statistical significance of the 
coefficient associated with the unemployment rate. 
However, and even after estimating by cell-means, there is another problem 
associated with the estimation of equation (2): the possible omission of relevant 
variables at the territorial level. If relevant variables are not included, the 
coefficient associated with the unemployment rate (the only territorial variable in 
the regression) could pick up part of these effects when unemployment is 
correlated with these omitted variables. To take this possibility into account, the 
usual approach in the literature consists of including regional fixed effects in 
each model; however, this is impossible when information is available for only 
one time period (year). Nevertheless, these provincial differences can be 
considered if regional fixed effects at a higher territorial aggregation level are 
included, for example, at the autonomous community level (NUTS II). 
However, in addition to the collinearity problems derived from the partial 
coincidence of the NUTS II and NUTS III classification (7 out of 17), the cell-
means estimation procedure implies a substantial reduction in the number of 
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observations and makes it impossible to include such a wide set of explanatory 
variables in the model. 
The problem can be tackled by including other variables at the territorial 
level that could help to explain the provincial wage differences once individual 
characteristics have been controlled. The literature describes several 
possibilities: the cost of living, climate, degree of unionisation, productive 
structure, among others. 
Again, the simultaneous introduction of all these variables would imply a 
reduction in the degrees of freedom and, consequently, a choice must be made. 
Finally, we chose to include the level of regional prices for 1990 in the 
specification of equation (2), as Kennedy and Borland (2000) (p.789) found that 
the results obtained when including the variable “average housing price” (in 
relation to a wider set of regional variables) are the closest to the model with 
regional fixed effects. 
Data on the level of regional prices was obtained from Lorente (1992). 
Following the directives of EUROSTAT, the INE carried out the Encuesta 
Regional de Precios during 1989 and Lorente forecasted these prices for 1988-
1991 by applying the annual increase of regional prices to the levels of 1989. 
However, the limitations of this statistical source for our analysis are relevant. On 
the one hand, data on the level of prices are given for autonomous communities 
and not for provinces. Therefore, the same level of prices was assigned all 
provinces in the same autonomous community. With the exception of the seven 
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autonomous communities that have only one province, this is a generalisation that 
limits the explanatory power of this variable. Moreover, data collection by the 
INE includes only information about large cities in the autonomous community. 
In spite of these limitations, this is the only indicator available on the level of 
regional prices. 
Taking into account the limitations of the variables related to price 
differentials, we also included an additional control variable: the average non-
agricultural productivity level in the province. Data for 1991 on Gross Added 
Value (GAV) and employed was obtained from the Fundación BBV regional 
dataset. 
The next section shows the results of estimating equation (2) augmented 
with the variables of regional prices and provincial productivity with the aim of 




We first estimated a “traditional” wage curve: a regression of individual 
wages, the control variables and the local unemployment rate (for non-
agricultural sectors). The results of estimating this model using “cell means” are 
shown in the first column of table 2 (to save pages in every table the results for 
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the control variables have been omitted)11. A significant and negative 
relationship between individual wages and the contemporaneous regional 
unemployment rate was observed, confirming the results obtained on wage 
curves for other countries. Moreover, the value of the coefficient, which can be 
interpreted as the elasticity of the curve, was –0.1312, a value close to the –0.10 
found by Blanchflower and Oswald. Our results show that the features of the 
Spanish labour market (the institutional framework or the characteristics of 
unemployment and its duration) do not appear to affect the sensitivity of 
individual wages to local unemployment. 
To control the possible endogeneity of unemployment, we estimated this 
same equation but used the past unemployment as an instrument variable13. The 
sign of the elasticity of wages to contemporaneous unemployment had not 
changed and its magnitude had slightly decreased although it was statistically 
                                                          
11 These results are available from the authors on request. 
12 The results of estimating a wage curve using individual data and applying ordinary least 
squares (using White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors) confirm the need to use the 
cell-means procedure: although the value of the coefficient is very close to the one obtained 
using cell-means, -0.11, the t-statistic is significantly higher, -7.23. 
13 This variable is the usual in the literature: see, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994b), Hoddinot (1996) or Kennedy and Borland (2000). However, in the Spanish case, and 
due to the high persistence of unemployment, this variable presents some limitations that we 
have tried to overcome considering different lags (from one to four) of the unemployment 
rate. 
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significant at the usual levels14. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the 
unemployment rate as an exogenous variable. 
Next, we estimated disaggregated wage curves by activity sectors using 
the EPA unemployment rates. The second column in Table 2 shows the 
elasticity of wages to local-sectorial unemployment rates. When these 150 
labour markets were considered (50 provinces by three non-agricultural activity 
sectors), the value of the elasticity was very similar to the previous one, -0.13 
but with a lower standard error. These results confirm that there is a wage curve 
for Spain a wage curve with an elasticity of close to –0.10. However, results 
differ when the elasticity is calculated for each of the three sectors considered. 
No wage curve was found for manufacturing while it was detected for the 
building and services sectors. 
In Spain the manufacturing sector probably has the highest level of 
unionisation and the oldest workers. According to international evidence, these 
two characteristics should generate a lower elasticity of wages to unemployment 
and even a flat curve. Moreover, as the data did not allow the separation of the 
diverse manufacturing activities15, the effect of unemployment to wages in each 
branch may be compensated among them. The characteristics of the building 
sector differ as the very nature of this activity promotes the use of fixed-term 
                                                          
14 These results are also available from the authors on request. 
15 The EPA and the Population Census only offer data for four activity sectors (agriculture, 
manufacturing, building and services) at the provincial level. 
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contracts (53.6% of total employees in 1990). Consequently, there is a high 
turnover that permits moderate wages when unemployment is high, but also 
makes it necessary to increase wages to retain workers when the economy grows 
and unemployment is low. The result is high elasticity (-0.15), greater than the 
total elasticity (-0.13). The elasticity of the services sector (-0.14) is clearly 
influenced by the fact that we excluded public sector workers. Although the 
services sector includes large firms in financial and transportation services, 
those remaining are usually small and usually offer less contractual stability16, 
and as a result, wages are clearly influenced by the unemployment rate. 
The results of estimating a wage curve by disaggregating wages and 
unemployment rates by gender are shown in Table 3. When assuming two 
labour markets in each province, one for men and the other for women (first 
column), a wage curve was found but at the 10% significance level and with a 
elasticity value of wages to unemployment close to –0.05. A more robust wage 
curve is found, however, for men with a significant elasticity of –0.09 at the 5% 
level. For women, no effect of unemployment on wages is found. These values 
could indicate that these two groups do not operate in separate labour markets 
                                                          
16 The percentage of fixed term contracts of the services sectors in 1990 was 26.8%, higher 
than the 24.9% of manufacturing. However, the relevant rate in this study is that 
corresponding to private activities of the services sector. Although there is no detailed enough 
statistical information, one can think that it was higher than the 30% or even 35% as the 
percentage of fixed term contracts of the public sector was of 15.8%. For example, the 
percentage in tourism activities was higher than 39%. 
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but in a total one. In this regard, the legal framework does not allow 
discrimination between men and women in terms of wages. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimated an equation for men but included the 
aggregate unemployment rate as an explanatory variable and then did the same 
for women. Our results, which are available on request, show that men’s’ wages 
are more responsive to changes in the total unemployment rate (-0.12) than to 
the unemployment rate for men only (-0.09). The elasticity for women was not 
statistically different from zero, although its significance has increased. 
The empirical evidence for other countries is contradictory. Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994a) for the United Kingdom, Baltagi and Blien (1998) for 
Germany, Canziani (1997) for Italy and Card (1995) for the United States 
obtained a higher elasticity for men than for women. However, Baltagi et al. 
(2000) reported the opposite result for East Germany. Finally, Janssens and 
Konings (1998) for Belgium, Groot et al. (1992) for the Netherlands and Collier 
(2000) for the United Kingdom did not find evidence of a wage curve for 
women. To explain their results, Groot et al. (1992) hold that unemployment not 
only affects wages but also participation decisions: a high level of 
unemployment increases the number of discouraged workers, thereby reducing 
the labour supply and increasing wages. Where this effect is low –for example, 
among men- the initial negative effect on wages will clearly dominate, but if this 
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effect is relevant –for example, for women- both effects will be opposite 
showing no evidence of a wage curve17. 
With the aim of considering other individual characteristics in the analysis 
of disaggregated wage curves, we also estimated wage equations, taking into 
account the distinct categories of age and schooling levels. We divided the 
sample in four age groups trying to approximate the segments of the Spanish 
labour market: workers from 20 to 24 years old, from 25 to 29, from 30 to 44 
and from 45 to 6418. The first column in Table 4 shows the results of an equation 
in which unemployment rates are defined for each age group but all the workers 
considered were included in the estimation. An elasticity value of –0.09 was 
found, which is lower than the initial value of –0.13. This result can be 
interpreted as workers of distinct ages competing for the same jobs19. 
The disaggregated results (columns 2 to 5 of Table 4) confirm the 
evidence obtained in other studies: the wages of young workers are most 
                                                          
17 To solve the problem, they estimated a simultaneous equation system formed by a wage 
equation and a participation equation. Their results show a wage curve for women in some 
years. 
18 We prefered to exclude workers from 16 to 19 years old from the analysis as required 
information was only available for 818 individuals. 
19 This result, and the previous one obtained when disaggregating by gender, cast doubts on 
the reliability of the estimates by Canziani (1997) and Montuenga et al. (2003) for Spain. 
Both authors defined regional labour markets by gender and ages, that are not strictly 
independent. 
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responsive to unemployment rates20. In particular, the maximum values of the 
coefficients estimated were –0.28 for the 20 to 24 year age group and –0.19 for 
those aged from 25 to 29 years, while no wage curve was detected for those over 
30. Several explanations can be offered to account for these results. Young 
workers have occupied the same post for less time (they are not in the internal 
labour market of the firm) and have not had time enough to accumulate specific 
human capital in the firm. Moreover, in the case of the Spanish economy, most 
have fixed term contracts (69.2%). These characteristics make young workers a 
very weak group in the labour market and firms can use their monopsonistic 
power to settle wages on the basis of the current unemployment rate. 
Wage curves for each educational level were also estimated from the data 
in the Population Census (Table 5). The joint consideration of three educational 
levels in each province (150 labour markets) provided an elasticity of –0.07, 
which was also lower than the initial results. The disaggregated results (in 
columns 2 to 4) show that there is a negative and significant relationship only 
between wages and unemployment for workers with medium education (at a 
significance level of the 10%). This result partially contradicts international 
evidence, which usually shows a decreasing elasticity with the number of 
                                                          
20 Similar evidence can be found in Baltagi and Blien (1998) for Germany, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994a) for the United Kingdom and Card (1995) for the United States. 
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schooling years21. The only reasonable explanation for this result22 is that in 
Spain there has been a large increase in the schooling level of young 
generations, who usually end secondary education or even university degrees. 
For this reason, data on the educational levels are related to ages. For example, 
most illiterate workers are older and something similar is observed with workers 
who achieved the secondary level of education: most are young people. Given 
that fixed term contracts are very common for young workers, it is not strange 
that the negative relationship between wages and unemployment is found for 
secondary education. 
The last disaggregation considered is related to occupation. In particular, 
we split the sample into two kinds of occupations: those in which highly 
qualified workers are needed and those that can be done by low and medium 
qualified workers. The information in the Population Census does not allow a 
proper calculation of the unemployment rate for these groups. For this reason, 
we used the total unemployment rate, which implies that we implicitly assume 
that qualified and non-qualified workers are in the same labour market. This 
assumption is not plausible for workers occupying high-qualified jobs but it is 
quite reasonable for those in low and medium-qualified jobs (as any worker, 
                                                          
21 See the works by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) for the United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom, Card (1995) for the United States and Turunen (1998) also for the United 
States. 
22 Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) found a similar anomaly when working with data for 
Australia that was confirmed by Kennedy and Borland (2000). 
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whether qualified or not, can try to obtain this kind of job). In support of this 
notion, a wage curve was found for those in low and medium qualified 
occupations (elasticity of –0.11) while for those in high-qualified occupations no 
effect of unemployment on wages was observed (Table 6). These findings are 
similar to those obtained in previous studies for other countries such as Germany 




The analysis in this paper found that there is a wage curve with a negative 
slope for the Spanish economy. This result is similar to those found by 
Blanchflower and Oswald for other countries. The estimates of the elasticity of 
individual wages to local unemployment rates was –0.13 when using provincial 
data, a value that is very close to those obtained by Blanchflower and Oswald 
and by other authors. Therefore, this result seems to confirm that differences in 
the institutional framework among countries do not affect the sensitivity of 
individual wages to local labour market conditions. 
The disaggregation of statistical information for groups of workers taking 
into account gender, age, educational level, activity sector and occupation 
showed considerable differences in the slope of the curve for each group. In this 
regard, a clear negative wage curve was found for men, while the wage for 
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women was not affected by unemployment rates, probably to the discouraged 
worker effect. 
By age, for young workers (from 20 to 29 years), a group with fixed-term 
contracts, there is a wage curve with a high elasticity, while no wage curve was 
detected for those over 30.  
Similarly, the wages of low-educated workers (most of them older) do not 
react to differences in local unemployment rates. However, for workers with 
medium educational levels, a wage curve with negative slope was found (most 
are young workers). Although, this result is not very usual in the literature, it is 
similar to the situation reported in Australia. Wage curves were also obtained for 
workers in the building and private service sectors, and for those employed in 
low-qualified occupations. 
In summary, for the less protected groups of the labour market, young 
workers, manual workers and building sector workers, a high negatively sloped 
wage curve was found. This result is similar to reports for other countries and is 
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Estimation by cell-means Provinces Provinces and sectors Provinces-manuf. Provinces-building Provinces-services 
Ln unempl.: coef. (t) -0.13 (-2.49)* -0.13 (-4.78)* -0.04 (-0.77) -0.15 (-3.58)* -0.14 (-2.53)* 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.69 0.78 0.53 0.45 
F 9.14 24.76 15.79 5.59 4.38 
Degrees of freedom 35 135 37 37 37 
N 50 150 50 50 50 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual nominal wage. Each model includes control variables for the following characteristics: 
gender, main income provider, potential experience and its square, part-time job, level of schooling (illiterate-without studies, elementary, medium 
and high) and occupation (low-medium qualification, high qualification). Each model also includes two variables that control for the levels of 
regional prices and provincial productivity. The models of the first and second columns also include variables that control the activity sector 
(manufacturing, building and services). 







Estimation by cell-means Provinces and gender Provinces-men Provinces-women 
Ln unempl.: coef. (t) -0.05 (-1.68)** -0.09 (-2.64)* -0.00 (-0.06) 
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.74 0.53 
F 64.36 12.00 5.26 
Degrees of freedom 85 36 36 
N 100 50 50 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual nominal wage. Each model includes control 
variables for the following characteristics: gender, main income provider, potential experience and its 
square, part-time job, level of schooling (illiterate-without studies, elementary, medium and high), activity 
sector (manufacturing, building and services) and occupation (low-medium qualification, high 
qualification). Each model also includes two variables that control for levels of regional prices and 
provincial productivity. The model of the first column also includes a variable that controls the gender of 
the individual. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 





Estimation by cell-means Provinces and ages Prov. 20-24 Prov. 25-29 Prov. 30-44 Prov. 45-64 
Ln unempl.: coef. (t) -0.09 (-2.90)* -0.28 (-2.73)* -0.19 (-2.21)* -0.04 (-0.78) -0.02 (-0.43) 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.31 0.44 0.59 0.71 
F 63.25 2.55 3.71 6.10 9.54 
Degrees of freedom 182 35 35 35 35 
N 200 50 50 50 50 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual nominal wage. Each model includes control variables for the following characteristics: gender, main income 
provider, potential experience and its square, part-time job, level of schooling (illiterate-without studies, elementary, medium and high), activity sector (manufacturing, 
building and services) and occupation (low-medium qualification, high qualification). Each model also includes two variables that control for levels of regional prices and 
provincial productivity. The first model also includes control variables for each of the age groups studied. 







Estimation by cell-means Prov. and studies Prov. – illiterate or 
elementary 
Prov. – medium Prov. – high 
Ln unempl.: coef. (t) -0.09 (-3.23)* -0.06 (-1.22) -0.17 (-2.00)** -0.15 (-1.65) 
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.61 0.40 0.44 
F 54.92 7.88 3.93 4.46 
Degrees of freedom 136 38 38 38 
N 150 50 50 50 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual nominal wage. Each model includes control variables of the following characteristics: gender, main income 
provider, potential experience and its square, part-time job, activity sector (manufacturing, building and services) and occupation (low-medium qualification, high 
qualification). Every model also includes two variables that control for the levels of regional prices and provincial productivity. The first model also includes control variables 
for the levels of studies (illiterate-without studies, elementary, medium and high). 
* Significant at the 5% level. 







Estimation by cell-means Provinces-high qualification Provinces-low-medium qualification 
Ln total unempl.: coef. (t) 0.06 (1.01) -0.11 (-2.30)* 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.67 
F 3.83 8.73 
Degrees of freedom 36 36 
N 50 50 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the annual nominal wage. Each model includes control 
variables for the following characteristics: gender, main income provider, potential experience and its square, 
part-time job, level of schooling (illiterate-without studies, elementary, medium and high) and activity sector 
(manufacturing, building and services). Each model also includes two variables that control for levels of regional 
prices and provincial productivity.  




Table 7. Description of the available sample from the EPF 90/91: Individuals by category 
 
    
Distribution by sectors  Distribution by gender 
Manufacturing 4432  Men 8776 
Building 1814  Women 3718 
Services 6248  Total 12494 
Total 12494    
     
Distribution by level of schooling  Distribution by ages 
Illiterate-without studies-Elementary 9442  From 16 to 19 years 818 
Medium 2008  From 20 to 24 years 2049 
High 1044  From 25 to 29 years 1975 
Total 12494  From 30 to 34 years 4538 
   From 45 to 64 years 3114 
Distribution by occupations  Total 12494 
High qualification 1648    
Low-medium qualification 10846    
Total 12494    
     
Distribution by provinces 
Alava 289  Lugo 130 
Albacete 201  Madrid 601 
Alicante 472  Málaga 288 
Almería 149  Murcia 320 
Avila 106  Navarra 290 
Badajoz 170  Orense 143 
Baleares 370  Asturias 217 
Barcelona 521  Palencia 177 
Burgos 199  Palmas (Las) 252 
Cáceres 189  Pontevedra 310 
Cádiz 306  Salamanca 112 
Castellón de la Plana 220  Sta. Cruz Tenerife 298 
Ciudad Real 193  Cantabria 231 
Córdoba 211  Segovia 142 
Coruña (La) 350  Sevilla 409 
Cuenca 105  Soria 149 
Girona 289  Tarragona 257 
Granada 181  Teruel 150 
Guadalajara 175  Toledo 167 
Guipúzcoa 339  Valencia 548 
Huelva 113  Valladolid 215 
Huesca 206  Vizcaya 433 
Jaén 216  Zamora 113 
León 238  Zaragoza 290 
Lleida 182  Total 12494 
Rioja (La) 262    
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Table 8. Correspondence between the occupations studied and the occupations available in the EPF 90/91 
 
 Description Codes of the occupations available in the EPF 
Masters in science and engineering 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 
Bachelors in science and engineering 7 
Writers, actors, sportsmen 14,15,16,17,18 
Teachers and other qualified workers 9,11,12,13,19 
Firm managers 20,21,40,41,50,51 
Office managers 31,35,36 
Sales executives 42,43,44 
High qualification 
occupations 
Technicians in mining and manufacturing. 70 
Other administrative staff 32,33,34,37,38,39 
Shop assistants and similar 45,49 
Hotel staff and individual services 53,56,57 
Protection and security 58 
Rest of services 52,54,55,59 
Specialised building workers 93,95 
Specialised mining workers 71,72,83,84,85,86,87 
Other specialised workers 73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,88,89,90,91,92,94 
Technicians in equipment machinery  96,97,98 
Low-medium 
qualification occupations 
Labourers 99 
 
 
